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THE LAW AND LARGE NUMBERS 
POLITICAL NUMERACY: MATHEMATICAL PER-
SPECTIVES ON OUR CHAOTIC CONSTITUTION. By 
Michael I. Meyerson'. W. W. Norton and Company. 2002. 
Pp. 9, 287. 
Paul H. Edelman2 
Can mathematics be used to inform legal analysis? This is 
not a ridiculous question. Law has certain superficial resem-
blances to mathematics. One might view the Constitution and 
various statutes as providing "axioms" for a deductive legal sys-
tem. From these axioms judges deduce "theorems" consisting of 
interpretation of these axioms in certain situations. Often these 
theorems are built on previously "proven" theorems, i.e. earlier 
decisions of the court. Of course some of the axioms might 
change, and occasionally a theorem that was once true becomes 
false; the former is a common feature of mathematics, the latter, 
though theoretically not possible in mathematics (since a theo-
rem is by definition true) has been known to happen in mathe-
matical practice as well.3 
So maybe mathematics can help law scholars. That is cer-
tainly what Michael Meyerson believes. His new book is "prem-
ised on the belief that there are many legal ideas that can be ex-
plained or clarified by mathematics." (p. 47) He presents an 
extended set of examples to illustrate how mathematics and 
mathematical thinking can be useful in understanding legal is-
I. Piper and Marbury Faculty Fellow and Professor of Law, University of Balti-
more School of Law. 
2. Professor of Mathematics and Law, Vanderbilt University. I have benefited 
from the comments of Mark Brandon, John Goldberg, Chris Guthrie, Robert Rasmus-
sen, and Suzanna Sherry. 
3. For example, the four color theorem was originally thought to be proven in 
1879 by Kempe. The flaw in his proof wasn't recognized until 1890 by Heawood. Sec N. 
L. Biggs, E. K. Lloyd and R. J. Wilson, Graph Theory 1736-1936 at 90 (Clarendon Press, 
1976). A correct proof was finally announced by Appel and Haaken in 1976. See Ken-
neth. Appel and Wolfgang Haken, Every Planar Map is Four Colorable, I & II, 21 Ill. J. 
Math. 429 (1977). 
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sues. Some of his examples are persuasive indeed. Others are 
less compelling. In this review I will describe some of his exam-
ples and assess how much the mathematics really adds to the le-
gal analysis. 
WHAT CONSTITUTES MATHEMATICAL THINKING? 
Before exploring Meyerson's examples it is worthwhile to 
consider what, exactly, it means to think mathematically about 
the law. There are a number of different things one might mean 
by this, although Meyerson treats them all the same. The persua-
siveness of his applications of mathematics to legal analysis de-
pends on which of these interpretations is being employed. 
One can break down mathematical thinking in the law into 
three types: general logic, technical mathematics, and mathe-
matical metaphor. By general logic I mean the use of standard 
deductive reasoning that might be taught in a formal logic class. 
For example, such claims as "If A implies B and B implies C 
then A implies C" or "If P implies Q then Q being false implies 
that Pis false" fall into this category. The syllogisms that Meyer-
son discusses (p. 25), such as 
1. All men are mortal. 
2. Socrates is a man. 
3. Therefore, Socrates is mortal. 
are also examples of what I call general logic. 
The second class of mathematical thinking is what I will re-
fer to as technical mathematics. Here theorems from mathemat-
ics are employed to provide a solution to a legal question. Tech-
nical mathematics is illustrated by Meyerson's discussion of the 
mathematical methods employed in the apportioning of the 
House of Representatives (p. 82). What distinguishes this class 
of thinking from general logic is the level of mathematical so-
phistication that is being employed. 
The final class of mathematical thinking is mathematical 
metaphor. In this style of thinking the ideas of mathematics are 
used as a source of inspiration but not put to any technical use. 
So when Meyerson discusses "constitutional topology" (p. 134) 
he does not intend to give a formal definition of the Constitution 
as a topological space, but rather to use the ideas of topology to 
give some informal description of certain properties of the Con-
stitution, to wit: 
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Imagine the federal government as a sphere containing all of 
the powers granted by the Constitution. Within that sphere, 
however, there exists a hole, consisting of the powers that are, 
in the words of the Tenth Amendment, "reserved to the 
States." Over time, the size of the hole has grown and shrunk 
relative to the size of the sphere, but the hole must remain if 
the Constitution's topological structure is to remain intact (p. 
138). 
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Clearly Meyerson does not believe that the Constitution is a 
sphere in any meaningful sense, but he finds the analogy of the 
sphere and the use of the language of topology illuminating.4 
The remainder of this review will discuss Meyerson's uses of 
each of these types of mathematical thinking. Meyerson's use of 
general logic is impeccable, but I will question if its use is dis-
tinctly mathematical. His use of technical mathematics is the 
most interesting and persuasive part of the book. In addition to 
describing some of his applications, I will suggest some further 
applications of technical mathematics. Finally, I will cast doubt 
upon Meyerson's use of mathematical metaphor in understand-
ing legal issues. 
GENERAL LOGIC 
Meyerson begins his foray into mathematical applications 
by considering the axiomatic nature of much of legal argumenta-
tion. He starts by analyzing the logical structure of the Declara-
tion of Independence (p. 28) and continues through a dissection 
of the logical foundations of Korematsu v. United States. 5 Along 
the way he finds an opportunity to discuss Euler's proof of the 
infinitude of prime numbers and Lindemann's proof that it is not 
possible to square a circle.6 
4. Sitting astride technical mathematics and mathematical metaphor is mathemati-
cal modeling. For example, Meyerson analyzes Marshall's dilemma in Marbury v. Madi-
son as a two-person game between Marshall and Jefferson. (p. 112) Now clearly Marshall 
and Jefferson were not literally playing such a game, but if the analogy between their 
situation and a two-person game is convincing, then one can employ a technical mathe-
matical analysis of the game to shed light on the real-world events. For lack of space I 
will not consider these chapters in this review, except to remark that in terms of quality 
of insight they seem to behave more like mathematical metaphor than technical mathe-
matics. 
5. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
6. Meyerson makes a small mathematical mistake in this section. He confuses con-
structible numbers, those numbers that can be constructed using a compass and a straight 
edge, with algebraic numbers, those that are the roots of polynomials with integer coeffi-
cients. All constructible numbers are algebraic, but the converse is not true. Given the 
context, this is a minor error. 
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The early part of the chapter demonstrates the influence 
that formal deductive proof had at the time of the Founders and 
how the structure of a formal proof was consciously mimicked by 
them in the Declaration of Independence. He goes on to show 
how formal deductive reasoning is evident in many Supreme 
Court opinions. I found this historical section particularly inter-
esting. 
Meyerson wants to make some stronger points as well. His 
main point is that all formal logical arguments start from the as-
sumption of certain axioms. If these axioms are false, then the 
validity of the subsequent deductions is irrelevant to the truth of 
the final conclusion. By subjecting legal arguments to a close 
logical reading one can uncover the axioms underlying the ar-
gument and thus better understand the nature of the argument. 
He applies this technique to notorious Supreme Court decisions 
such as Dred Scott7 and Korematsu. 
Meyerson's reminder that assumptions, both stated and un-
stated, are critical in deductive logic is an important one. It is of-
ten the first place to look in analyzing an argument. At the foun-
dation of mathematical thinking is the ability to understand the 
difference between hypotheses and theorems, and so this is a 
fine beginning to Meyerson's task of demonstrating the impor-
tance of mathematical thinking to legal analysis. 
It would have been helpful, though, if Meyerson had been 
more careful about two things. First, just because an argument is 
logically flawed, either because an assumption is false or because 
of some other logical error, it does not follow that the conclusion 
is false. Many scholars have critiqued the logic of Roe v. Wade8 
but still support the result.9 So Meyerson's assertion that "Obvi-
ously, if the logical argument is not well-formulated, ... the re-
sult is laughable," (p. 25) is simply not correct. It is one thing to 
say that the conclusion is not proved, quite another to claim that 
the conclusion is itself false. 
The second point about which Meyerson could have been 
more careful is his use of the term axiom. Early in his discussion 
of formal logic Meyerson defines an axiom as "'a statement used 
in the premises of arguments and assumed to be true without 
7. Dred Scott v. Sanford 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
8. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
9. Sec, for instance, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and 
Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 375 (1985), Donald Regan, Rewrit-
ing Roe v. Wade, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1569 (1979), Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 
Harv. L. Rev. 737 (1989). 
2002] BOOK REVIEWS 463 
proof."' 10 He then notes that a set of axioms "should be simple 
and consistent with one another," as well as "logically independ-
ent." (p. 24) With these definitions, then, it is incorrect to assert 
that an axiom is false within the logical system that it defines. 
But Meyerson later forgets his own definition when he dis-
cusses Dred Scott. He notes that Taney's decision rests on the 
axiom that African-Americans are inherently inferior to whites, 
and remarks that "One lesson from Dred Scott is that if you start 
with an incorrect axiom, you are unable to reason intelligently." 
(p. 35) But this is a mischaracterization of what Taney did. He 
reasoned quite intelligently from the axioms that he started with. 
What Meyerson really means is that if Taney had chosen a dif-
ferent axiom, say the inherent equality of African-Americans 
and whites, then he would have come to a different conclusion. 
While Meyerson has demonstrated that general logic is im-
portant in legal analysis, it leaves open the question of whether it 
should be considered uniquely mathematical. If so, then any dis-
cipline that proceeds in the western intellectual tradition can be 
said to benefit from mathematical thinking. That conclusion un-
dercuts the novelty of Meyerson's claims. 
These quibbles aside, Meyerson's beginning is a good one. 
He reminds us that it is important to make clear what one is as-
suming and what one is concluding in any argument, but particu-
larly in legal ones, where it is easy to leave the hypotheses un-
stated. The more transparent the logic, the better it can be 
assessed. 
TECHNICAL MATHEMATICS 
It is in chapters 2-4 that Meyerson is best able to support his 
claim that mathematics can illuminate legal thinking. In these 
chapters he examines voting rules-including ruminations on the 
benefits of the electoral college-considers the super-majority 
aspects of the Constitution, and discusses the difficulties in ap-
portioning seats in Congress. With interesting mathematics to be 
discussed and interesting law to ponder, this is the best part of 
the book. The only thing wrong is that there is not enough of it. 
Meyerson missed opportunities to put his material in a broader 
context and to include some additional mathematics, some even 
considered by the Supreme Court itself. 
10. P. 24 citing John Daintith and R. David Nelson, The Penguin Dictionary of 
Mathematics 26 (Viking Penguin Press, 1989). 
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The theme of these chapters is voting and representation.11 
Mathematicians have been analyzing voting methods since the 
late 19th century, starting with the Marquis de Condorcet and 
his rival Jean Charles de Borda in pre-Revolutionary France. 
These efforts were directed toward trying to find fair methods of 
representation from an axiomatic standpoint. This intellectual 
thread led to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem in 1951. Meyerson 
does an excellent job explaining these ideas and showing their 
relevance to contemporary voting. 
There have been a number of proposals to move to more 
sophisticated voting methods in order to address some of the 
problems that Meyerson discusses. Perhaps the most prominent 
proponent of alternative voting schemes is Lani Guinier, 12 who 
advocated cumulative voting (among other methods) as a way to 
ensure that the rights of minorities were not abused by the ma-
jority. In fact a number of local governments have implemented 
sophisticated voting schemes in order to ensure minority repre-
sentation. In some instances these methods have been instituted 
as part of a settlement of suits brought under the Voting Rights 
Act. 13 It would have been interesting to see how these methods 
relate to Meyerson's formal discussion of voting methods. 
There is yet another thread of research in voting to which 
Meyerson only alludes: the question of measuring voting power. 
A voter is said to be pivotal in an election if her vote determines 
the outcome, that is, if a change in her vote would alter the out-
come. For instance, in the last Presidential election, every state 
that voted for Bush was pivotal. The now-accepted measure of 
power in a voting system is the probability that any given voter 
will be pivotal. Meyerson mentions this briefly and refers to the 
resulting measure of power developed by Shapley and Shubik. 
(p. 52) While the Shapley-Shubik measure has some of the prop-
erties necessary to accurately measure voting power, the more 
II. I will confine my remarks to the areas of mathematics discussed by Meyerson. It 
is important to be aware, however, that there are other areas of mathematics relevant to 
law as well. Probability theory has been used to assess the value of value of evidence for 
at least 35 years, notably in People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319 (1968) and has been the 
source of considerable legal commentary, most famously in Laurence Tribe, Trial by 
Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329 (1970). 
More recently, the use of DNA evidence has been scrutinized in a similar way. See, for 
example, J. McKenna, J. Cecil and P. Coukos, Reference Guide on Forensic DNA Evi-
dence, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 273 (Federal Judicial Center, 1994). 
12. Lani Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority (Free Press, 1994). 
!3. For a general introduction and references sec Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. 
Karlan, and Richard Pildcs, The Law of Democracy (Foundation Press, 2001). 
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commonly accepted measure was developed by Banzhaf. 14 
Banzhaf developed this measure of power in 1964, in the wake of 
Reynolds v. Sims, 15 as a way of deciding what voting schemes 
would meet the requirement of "one man-one vote." It is the 
Banzhaf measure that has been used in litigation, some of which 
has made it to the Supreme Court. 
To see how Banzhaf's method works, consider the example 
that Meyerson uses to illustrate the use of a bicameral system. 
(p. 53) He considers a small republic with four states, Virginia, 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island with populations 
100, 80, 60 and 10 respectively. If representation is on a 10 to 1 
basis then in the legislature they will have 10, 8, 6, and 1 repre-
sentatives, respectively. It requires 13 votes to pass legislation. 
Finally suppose that state delegations vote as a bloc. What 
power does Rhode Island have in this voting scheme? The an-
swer is 0. Why? There is no situation in which Rhode Island 
could cast a deciding vote. In order to get the requisite 13 votes 
to win, two of the three large states would have to cast votes in 
favor and that would ensure at least 14 votes, so no matter what 
Rhode Island does, the outcome would be the same. 16 
How many times will Virginia be pivotal? It will be pivotal 
in 4 instances, when it votes with Massachusetts (resulting in 18 
votes in favor), with Connecticut (16), with Massachusetts and 
Rhode Island (19), and finally with Connecticut and Rhode Is-
land (17). It will not be pivotal if it votes the same way as both 
Massachusetts and Connecticut, since in that instance, if Virginia 
were to change sides, the result would still pass since Massachu-
setts and Connecticut would together provide 14 votes to pass 
the legislation. A srmilar analysis would show that Massachusetts 
and Connecticut will be pivotal in 4 instances as well. This shows 
that all three of the larger states have the exact same amount of 
power (under the Banzhaf measure) even though they have dif-
fering numbers of votes. So we conclude that the power in this 
legislature is divided among the states with each large state get-
ting 113 and Rhode Island getting 0. 
14. For an explanation of why we should use the Banzhaf measure and not the 
Shapley-Shubik measure see Dan S. Felsenthal and Moshe Machover, The Measurement 
of Voting Power: Theory and Practice, Problems and Paradoxes 196 (Edward Elgar Pub-
lishing, 1998). There is some more really nice mathematics here, but it would be too 
much of a digression to deal with now. 
15. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
I 6. Meyerson says that Rhode Island "would rarely, if ever, be pivotal." (p. 53) In 
fact the answer is that it never has any chance. 
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But suppose we are interested in the power of the voters in 
the states, and not in the power of the states themselves. How 
should we compute the power of a citizen of Virginia? It turns 
out that the mathematics says that the power of an individual 
voter is the product of how often a particular voter is pivotal in 
electing a representative with the power of the state itself. It fur-
ther happens that the likelihood of a voter being pivotal is pro-
portional to the reciprocal of the square-root of the population. 
For example, in the case of Virginia, the power of an individual 
voter is proportional to 1110, the reciprocal of the square root of 
100, and so the voter's total power in the legislature is 1110 x 113 
= 1130.17 
Banzhaf's methods first appear in litigation in Whitcomb v. 
Chavis, 18 which is the most mathematically interesting opinion 
ever rendered by the Supreme Court. The issue before the Court 
was whether a multi-member district for the Indiana state legis-
lature was constitutional. Banzhaf's method inspired a mathe-
matical attack on the constitutionality of multi-member districts 
per se. The essence of the argument was described in the major-
ity opinion this way: 
In asserting discrimination against voters outside Marion 
County, plaintiffs recognize that Fortson, Burns, and Kilgarlin 
proceeded on the assumption that the dilution of voting 
power suffered by a voter who is placed in a district 10 times 
the population of another is cured by allocating 10 legislators 
to the large district instead of the one assigned to the smaller 
district. Plaintiffs challenge this assumption at both the voter 
and legislator level. They demonstrate mathematically that in 
theory voting power does not vary inversely with the size of 
the district and that to increase legislative seats in proportion 
to increased population gives undue voting power to the voter 
in the multimember district since he has more chances to de-
termine election outcomes than does the voter in the single-
member district. 19 
In an extended footnote20 the majority outlined Banzhaf's the-
ory, including a small example. Ultimately the majority rejected 
Banzhaf's arguments as being too "theoretical" and refused to 
find that multi-member districts were unconstitutional. Instead, 
17. Felscnthal and Machover, The Measurement of Voting Power at 63 ff (cited in 
note 14). 
18. 403 u.s. 124. 
19. ld. at 144. 
20. ld. at footnote 23. 
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they rested their analysis on a more traditional measure of rep-
resentation by computing the number of people per representa-
tive and deciding that the spread in these numbers across dis-
tricts exceeded the permissible variation.21 
In his dissent, Justice Harlan reacted harshly to the innu-
meracy of his colleagues, commenting that "The only relevant 
difference between the elementary arithmetic on which the 
Court relies and the elementary probability theory on which 
Professor Banzhaf relies is that calculations in the latter field 
cannot be done on one's fingers." 22 He proceeds to attack the va-
lidity of Banzhaf's model on a mathematical basis.23 Particularly 
noteworthy in his critique is that his calculations at one point 
produce the number 120,000,000,000,000,000,000/4 certainly the 
largest number ever to appear in a Supreme Court opinion. 
This is not the only case in which Banzhaf's work appears. 
His methods were endorsed in Ianucci v. Board of Supervisori5 
as the way to measure power in a county board. The same meth-
ods were rejected in a challen9e to the constitutionality of New 
York City's Board of Estimate 6 and in a challenge to the consti-
tutionality of the Nassau County Board of Supervisors.27 His 
work has also been used to show that the Electoral College is bi-
ased in favor of voters in large states even if it is biased in favor 
of the small states themselves.Z8 It should be clear that there is a 
rich mathematical theory here with many important legal impli-
cations, which remains almost unknown in the broader legal 
community. Meyerson missed a perfect opportunity to remedy 
this. 
The second of the technical mathematics chapters is de-
voted to the issue of super-majority rules in the Constitution. 
21. Id. at 161-62. 
22. Id. Justice Harlan, dissenting, at footnote 2. 
23. Id. at 169. 
24. Harlan claims this number is the ratio of the probability that a voter in Marion 
County, Indiana is pivotal if no voter is already committed to the candidate, to the prob-
ability that a voter is pivotal if 15,000 of the voters were committed to one candidate and 
10,000 were committed to the other. Id. By my calculations the number is closer to 
52,800,000,000,000,000,000. 
25. /anucci v. Board of Supervisors of Washington County, NY, 282 NYS 2d 502 
(1967). While endorsing Banzhafs method, the court misapplied the analysis. Sec Fclscn-
thal and Machover, The Measurement of Voting Power at 99 (cited in note 14). 
26. Board of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989). 
27. League of Women Voters of Nassau County v. Nassau County Board of Supervi-
sors, 737 F.2d 155 (1984). 
28. See John F. Banzhaf, lll, One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the 
Electoral College, 13 Viii. L. Rev. 304 (1968) and Guillermo Owen, Game Theory 212 
(Academic Press, 2d ed. 1982). 
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The chapter contains an interesting historical discussion based 
on Madison's notes of the constitutional convention. In particu-
lar Meyerson notes that there was considerable discussion of 
whether the super-majority requirement should be set at 2/3 or 
3/4 for overriding a veto. (p. 76) He also notes that the only time 
the requirement was set at 3/4 instead of 2/3 was in the instance 
of the number of states needed to ratify an amendment to the 
Constitution. (p.73) Unfortunately, Meyerson does not investi-
gate further why the ratification supermajority is higher than the 
others. One possible explanation is the difference in baselines. 
The Articles of Confederation had required unanimous consent 
to make amendments, so the 3/4 requirement was already a re-
duction. But the baseline for legislative acts was a simple major-
ity, so requiring 2/3 was already an increase. 
He also neglects to mention that the bicameral structure of 
our government is inherently super-majoritarian. Buchanan and 
Tullock had already remarked on this in their seminal work in 
196229 and it has been a theme throughout constitutional schol-
arship ever since.30 It would have been very helpful if Meyerson 
had discussed some of Buchanon and Tullock's models in this 
chapter. 
In the final technical chapter, Meyerson discusses the his-
tory and theory of the apportionment of Congress. The mathe-
matics of apportionment is beautiful and Meyerson does a fine 
job of explaining it in such a confined space. It certainly would 
have benefited from a more leisurely exposition.31 
These criticisms should not diminish the excellence of these 
chapters, however. Meyerson explains the mathematics clearly 
and shows how it applies to the Constitution. It is a unique con-
tribution to the literature to have these subjects in one place and 
related to each other. I hope that this exposure of technical 
methods in legal analysis will lead to a wider appreciation for 
29. James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, 233-48 (U. 
of Michigan Press, 1962). 
30. For a recent example see John 0. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Our 
Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 703 (2002). 
31. The bible of this subject is Michel L. Balinski and H. Peyton Young, Fair Repre-
sentation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote (Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 
which is a truly wonderful book devoted solely to the issues of apportionment and pro-
portional representation. It contains a wealth of information, both historical and mathe-
matical. For a briefer discussion of the history of the apportionment of Congress and the 
results under the 2000 census, see Paul H. Edelman and Suzanna Sherry, Pick a Number, 
Any Number: State Representation in Congress after the 2000 Census, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 211 
(2002). 
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them and to an increased use of their methods where appropri-
ate. 
METAPHOR 
We now come to the metaphorical uses of mathematics. 
Chapters 7-11 might be best described as ruminations on the 
Constitution inspired by mathematics. They employ ideas from 
chaos theory to incompleteness theory, from transfinite mathe-
matics to topology. It is not productive to deal with each chapter 
separately as the shortcomings of this style of argument are 
pretty consistent. Instead I will focus on two of the chapters: In-
finity and the Constitution (Chapter 8) and Constitutional Chaos 
(Chapter 10). Elsewhere I have commented on similar rumina-
tions on the law using ideas from calculus.32 
Before dealing with specifics, I want to consider the differ-
ent ways in which metaphor can be put to use as an explanatory 
device. One way is by relating an unfamiliar object to a familiar 
one. So when someone says "Alligator tastes just like chicken," 
this metaphor conveys some information if you haven't ever had 
alligator, but you have eaten chicken. Of course it would also be 
helpful if you've eaten alligator but not chicken. But this meta-
phor is more or less useless if you have eaten neither alligator 
nor chicken. 
Imagine that you know nothing about either topology or 
federalism. How helpful was the earlier description of the rela-
tive power of the states in the federal constitution to you? If you 
know something about the law, then maybe you could get a hint 
of what topology is about. Or maybe a topologist might get some 
insight into federalism. The use of this metaphor is very much 
dependent on the audience for which it is intended. 
A more sophisticated use of metaphor is available if some-
one knows both sides of the relationship. In such circumstances 
it may be possible to transfer information from one side to the 
other. For example, after Meyerson asks "Is the Constitution 
Chaotic" (p. 196) he goes on to find" ... patterns that are remi-
niscent of those in modern chaos theory." (p. 197) Having estab-
lished the analogy between chaotic systems and the Constitution, 
one can use more detailed information in the one as clues to 
what to look for in the other. 
32. Paul H. Edelman, A Tour of Mistakes, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 343 (1998) (critiquing 
Steven Lubet, A Tour of the Calculus of Justice, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1035 (1998)). 
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There are two difficulties with this more sophisticated use of 
metaphor. The first is that it requires the audience to be some-
what familiar with both sides of the metaphor. The other prob-
lem is that as a general rule the more one knows about one or 
the other side, the less persuasive these metaphors tend to be. It 
is, perhaps, an instance of a little knowledge being a dangerous 
thing. 
Meyerson wants to employ metaphor in this more sophisti-
cated way, but that presents a problem: the number of people 
who are knowledgeable in both law and mathematics is rather 
small. His solution is to assume his audience knows only about 
the Constitution and begin each of these chapters by explaining 
the relevant mathematics. The idea is to teach enough of the 
mathematics that the metaphors will be accessible and then dis-
cuss how the mathematical ideas inspire insights into constitu-
tional analysis. The first part of this program is pretty successful. 
Meyerson's mathematical introductions are surprisingly good, 
especially given the limited space they are allotted. They are 
smoothly written and give a friendly introduction to lot of attrac-
tive mathematics. But then we get to the applications, and things 
start to run downhill. 
Consider his chapter on infinity. (p. 148) Meyerson begins 
this chapter by summarizing the work of Cantor. Cantor starts 
from the premise that two sets of objects are said to have the 
same number of elements (the mathematical term is cardinality), 
if there is a one-to-one correspondence between the elements of 
one set and the other set. He shows that the set of counting 
numbers {1,2,3, ... ) has the same cardinality as the set of even 
numbers by providing a one-to-one correspondence between 
them. He calls sets that have the same cardinality as the counting 
numbers countable. He goes on to mention the result of Cantor 
that the set of real numbers between 0 and 1 can not be put in 
one-to-one correspondence with the counting numbers and 
hence has a larger cardinality. This is all classic, pretty, mathe-
matics that is not as widely known as it should be. He summa-
rizes his discussion by relating the three relevant points about in-
finity: 
The first is that you never can reach infinity; it goes on for-
ever. Second, some infinite sets are the same size, even 
though they do not seem as if they should be. Finally, not all 
infinite sets are the same size; some are larger than others. (p. 
152) 
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There is a problem with this synopsis. He uses "infinity" in 
the first sentence to mean something different than he did in his 
mathematical discussion. Meyerson defined infinity as the size of 
a certain kind of set. It doesn't make any sense to talk about it 
going on forever. It isn't going anywhere in his discussion. He 
can't even mean that the elements of the set are getting arbitrar-
ily large, since in the case of the numbers between 0 and 1 they 
aren't. He is using "infinity" in this summary to mean something 
unbounded in some dimension. This makes his attempts to use 
the original definition of infinity somewhat suspect. Neverthe-
less, Meyerson then gives an application to legal analysis for 
each of the three points in his summary. 
As an application of the assertion that "you never can reach 
infinity; it goes on forever," Meyerson discusses the fact that 
"the United States has a Constitution of infinite duration" (p. 
152) and describes the debate among the Founders as to 
whether, in fact, the document was really of perpetual durability. 
What any of this has to do with the mathematical notions of in-
finity that Meyerson spent so much time on is left unclear. The 
section is closed with the remark that "Thus, in a somewhat 
Newtonian sense, the Constitution is infinite. Just as a body in 
motion will continue indefinitely unless some force acts on it, so 
will the Constitution sta:X in force until altered by 'some solemn 
and authoritative act."' 3 Of course this "Newtonian sense" is 
again not the same notion of infinity as the one to which we were 
introduced. 
Of course, all of the discussion about infinity obscures what 
would seem to be the more interesting constitutional question: is 
our current Constitution really the same as the one the Founders 
signed? If it isn't, then in what sense is the Constitution of "infi-
nite duration?" Many have argued that the Constitution has 
been altered in ways that are not strictly constitutional.34 It is 
particularly difficult to justify the claim that the pre-Civil War 
Constitution is the same as the Constitution including the Re-
construction Amendments.35 So does the metaphor of "infinite 
duration" provide any useful information at all? 
33. P. 155 quoting Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton). 
34. See, for example, Sanford Levinson, Accounting for Constitutional Change, 8 
Const. Comm. 409 (1991) and Bruce Ackerman, I We the People: Foundations (Harvard 
U. Press, 1991). 
35. For a discussion of how the ratification of the 13th and 14th amendments vio-
lated Article V see Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 Yale 
L.J. 453, 501 (1989). See also Mark E. Brandon, Free in the World: American Slavery and 
Constitutional Failure 201 (Princeton U. Press, 1998) ("Undoubtedly, though, taken to-
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Let us look at Meyerson's third point, that "not all infinite 
sets are the same size; some are larger than others." He uses this 
observation to show that one thing of infinite value might be 
smaller than another. 
For example, my life, to me, is of infinite value. I will do 
whatever I can to prolong my life, to be as healthy as I can 
be .... My children's lives, however, are worth far more to me 
than my own. (p. 160) 
He then goes on to say that this provides a framework to discuss 
the abortion question, giving equal credence to the views of both 
sides. 
Does infinity really play any role here? First it is important 
to note that while Meyerson claims that his life has infinite value 
to him, it is unlikely that he behaves in a way consistent with that 
belief. If he valued his life infinitely, he would do nothing which 
would put it at risk, since no matter how small the probability of 
harm, the expected value of such an action would be infinite. 
Thus, he wouldn't drive (cars are dangerous), he would probably 
hide in the basement (tornadoes, hurricanes, meteor showers), 
and eat only bread and purified water (pesticides and E. coli). I 
have no doubt that he values his life highly, but not infinitely.36 
But if he doesn't really value his own life at infinity, then 
there is no problem with him valuing the life of his children more 
(although also finitely, since I presume that he drives them in a 
car on occasion). So we are back to the mundane comparison of 
large finite numbers. Once again, the metaphor is not very help-
ful. 
Meyerson illustrates his second point, that "some infinite 
sets are the same size, even though they do not seem as if they 
should be," by the notion of "infinite rights." (p. 155) "The con-
cept of infinity helps explain why some constitutional conflicts 
are so difficult to resolve. When dealing with finite quantities, we 
can decide readily which is greater. But in the realm of funda-
mental rights and liberties, we are dealing with freedoms of infi-
nite value for which simple comparisons may be impossible." 
(pp. 155-56) 
gether, the Amendments' principles were the core of a fundamentally different political 
world.") 
36. Just a page before he discusses the infinite value of life, Meyerson relates a 
similar argument used by Learned Hand to decide when the danger to society is suffi-
cient to justify a burden on free speech. (p. 159) 
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As already discussed it is unlikely that freedoms are really 
of "infinite value," whatever that might mean.37 But even if these 
freedoms were of infinite value, it is not clear what the implica-
tions are. Meyerson believes that it works in support of the pro-
tection of rights: 
Recognizing the infinite value of speech is also helpful in ex-
plaining the need to be vigilant against even the smallest re-
strictions on free expression. A fraction of infinity still equals 
infinity. The loss of even a fraction of the right of free expres-
sion imposes a burden of infinite scope. (p. 157) 
But that is certainly not the only way to view the matter. If 
half of infinity is still infinity then a fractional burden on the 
right of free expression leaves one with exactly the same amount 
of freedom, doesn't it? If the value of this reduced right is the 
same as the original then no harm is done. Is this any less per-
suasive than Meyerson's own argument? 
Moreover, none of this is really useful in analyzing govern-
ment burdens on individual rights. Meyerson concludes that "In 
a complicated world, we must recognize that there frequently 
will be situations where more than one interest of infinite value 
is at stake. Simplistic comparisons must, therefore, of necessity 
give way to a far more sensitive evaluation of these competing 
interests." (p. 159) It is difficult to argue with this sentiment, but 
what is gained by talking about infinity? Is the usual discourse of 
balancing of rights and undue burden insufficient? Meyerson 
never explains further. 
Ultimately, at the end of this chapter, the reader has been 
introduced to some pretty mathematics, but the subsequent legal 
musings are inconsistent with the presentation of the mathemat-
ics, misapply the mathematics at times, and ultimately fail to 
demonstrate any usefulness for the metaphor proffered. If any-
thing, the mathematical concepts have led to muddier thinking 
than before. 
As a second example of Meyerson's use of mathematical 
metaphor, let us look at his discussion of chaos theory and the 
Constitution. Chaos theory is a generic name for a number of re-
lated mathematical topics. Meyerson attempts to give an intro-
duction to the topic in twelve pages. I am not sure how helpful it 
37. In this section he still is not using the term "infinity" as the size of a set, but 
rather as a shorthand for unbounded. 
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really is to someone who has little previous knowledge.38 Terms 
get introduced with little or no definition (strange attractors and 
bifurcation) and topics having nothing to do with chaos are men-
tioned (catastrophe theory). Nevertheless, since no real mathe-
matics is employed in the legal discussion, the technical descrip-
tion is irrelevant. 
Ultimately Meyerson characterizes chaotic systems as de-
terministic systems defined by simple rules that lead to complex 
behaviors. In particular, these systems are so sensitive to initial 
conditions that "long-range prediction is impossible." (p. 192) 
Meyerson then poses the question "How meaningful is it to say 
that the Constitution is chaotic?" and after some caveats con-
cludes "the entire issue of constitutional interpretation by the 
Supreme Court has much in common with a dynamic, chaotic 
system." (p. 197) He goes on to tell two different and somewhat 
contradictory stories about constitutional interpretation. 
The first story is a "chaotic" explanation of the intricacy of 
current constitutional doctrine. "Under the doctrine of stare de-
cisis, each decision builds on previous ones .... [E]ach ruling de-
pends on how the Court ruled the previous time a similar case 
was decided. Moreover, ... the longer the time span under con-
sideration, the more cycles of iteration occur and the greater the 
likelihood of complexity." He illustrates it thus: ". . . [T]he 
Court's striking down of a law barring parents from sending their 
children to private school led to its declaration that bans on the 
sale of contraceptive devices to married couples were unconsti-
tutional, which, in turn, led to Roe v. Wade." He summarizes this 
discussion with the quote "'How can simple rules lead to com-
plex phenomena? Via long runtime."'39 
There are at least two objections one might make to this 
story. The first is that Meyerson assumes a very mechanistic 
form of legal rulemaking in which the outcome of each case is 
completely decided by previous decisions. He has to take this 
view if he wants to view constitutional interpretation through a 
chaotic lens, because his chaotic model is dependent on the sys-
tem being deterministic. But this view has come under intense 
attack and has largely been discredited.40 
38. There is a particularly nasty typo in the table on page 190 in which, I presume, 
the parameter a is replaced by A. 
39. P. 198 quoting Rudy Rucker, Mind Tools 314 (Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1987). 
40. See, generally, Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, Desperately Seeking Cer-
tainty: The Misguided Quest for Constitutional Foundations (U. of Chicago Press, 2002). 
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The second objection one might raise is to the assertion that 
the outcomes of constitutional interpretation have become in-
creasingly complex. What does such an assertion mean? Cer-
tainly the issues before the Court are more intricate but does 
that mean the system itself is more complex? Without some sort 
of definition of complexity it is hard to know. Meyerson is not 
helpful in this regard. 
The second story that Meyerson tells is considerably differ-
ent. He asserts that "the fact that the current state of constitu-
tional doctrine is vastly different from what the framers would 
have envisioned should not be considered surprising" in the light 
of chaos theory. (p. 199) He explains this by saying that the lack 
of precise understanding of what the framers would have wanted 
results "in a very different constitutional path from what the 
framers ever would have expected." (p. 199) He concludes that 
"[i]t is unrealistic to expect that our current doctrine would fulfill 
the framers' expectations. Even were society not to change, the 
long-term iteration of inevitably imperfect decisions would tend 
to lead to results that were unforeseeable initially." (p. 200) 
The first question we might ask is whether it is true that the 
current state of constitutional interpretation is all that different 
from what the framers would have envisioned if they were privy 
to all that went before. Meyerson never gives any support for 
this position, but it certainly warrants some sort of justification. 
Even if it is significantly different, is the discrepancy getting lar-
ger or smaller over time? Again Meyerson is silent. 
And even if we were to accept the truth of these assertions, 
it is not clear that the constitutional regime Meyerson describes 
is consistent with chaos theory as he describes it. If the Constitu-
tion is chaotic, then it is deterministic, i.e., once it gets going eve-
rything is decided. We saw this in the first story that Meyerson 
tells. There is no room in this description for current judges to 
get the answer to a legal question wrong. If the current state of 
constitutional interpretation is not what the framers would have 
thought, it must be because they had an imprecise knowledge of 
the "initial conditions" of the Constitution, not because current 
judges misinterpreted their intent. 
The rest of this chapter is very similar to the earlier parts. 
Meyerson invokes more ideas from chaos theory (fractals, 
strange attractors, stability) as springboards for analyzing the 
Constitution. The inspirations are not always consistent with 
each other, and the legal positions are at best undeveloped. In-
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evitably the reader remains unconvinced that chaos theory really 
sheds any light whatsoever. 
These two chapters are, I think, representative of the Mey-
erson's use of mathematical metaphor. While the introductory 
mathematical material can be interesting, the application to the 
law is to often strained or just inapt. Mostly they seem to serve 
as cover for undeveloped legal musings. Ultimately one is left 
unsatisfied. 
CONCLUSION 
Can mathematics be used to inform legal analysis? The an-
swer, like that of many such questions, is yes and no. Certainly 
the logical rigor of mathematical thought is helpful in analyzing 
legal arguments in the same way that it is useful to analyze any 
other sort of argument. True technical mathematics can be use-
ful, indeed almost necessary, in analyzing a relatively small, but 
interesting, class of legal problems. But mathematical metaphor 
seems to be of little use and perhaps only serves to confuse.4 
It would be churlish, however, to dismiss Political Numeracy 
this quickly, for it has more than just legal analysis to offer the 
reader. Meyerson clearly enjoys mathematics and does a fine job 
conveying that enthusiasm. His exposition of mathematical top-
ics is very accessible and is, if not completely accurate, faithful to 
the subject. It provides an entry to some very beautiful mathe-
matical topics with which every educated person should be fa-
miliar (but most are not). In this innumerate world, that is a sub-
stantial accomplishment and worthy of respect in itself. 
41. It is worth considering whether mathematical metaphor is inherently less useful 
than, say, sports metaphors. I would say that it is likely to be less useful for two reasons. 
First, the likelihood of the mathematics being misapplied is probably higher, and second, 
the patina of certitude that mathematics provides discourages a critical view of the meta-
phor. But, cf. Mark A. Graber, Law and Sports Officiating: A Misunderstood and Justly 
Neglected Relationship 16 Canst. Comm. 293 (1999). 
